The national Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) programmes of Mexico were originally based on the neoclassical economic theory that conceptualized ecosystems as factories whose various outputs can be quantified and converted to commodities. This model of PES clashed with an alternative theorization, Compensation for Ecosystem Services (CES), with homegrown roots in the ontological orientation and contextualized experience of an epistemic community of public intellectuals with deep engagement in rural Mexico. While built upon the same basic premise -that healthy ecosystems produce services of value -the CES model reimagines payments as compensation for the sustainable stewardship and labour of rural communities and, mediated by the state, as a means to counteract the systemic structural inequities between rural and urban and global North and South. Based on discourse analysis of a series of key actor interviews, longitudinal participant observation and policy analysis, this article explores: 1) the common conceptual underpinnings in the theory of CES, but also the variances; 2) the specific influence of this model on the design of the national PES programmes; and 3) the ways in which this influence has been mediated by politics and shifting relations of power in Mexico.
INTRODUCTION
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) is a now ubiquitous approach to promoting both conservation and development in the global South, particularly in Latin America (Ezzine de Blas et al., 2016a) . The basic conceptual elements of the PES approach are that those who benefit from cleaner, more abundant water, greenhouse gas sequestration, biodiversity conservation or other such 'services', should provide financial or other compensation to those who own and/or manage the ecosystems that produce them (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005) .
The environmental economists and ecologists who originated the concept devised a model of PES in which, as long as impacts can be measured, transaction costs are low and property rights are clear, it is assumed that markets for ecosystem services will form and become autonomous, supporting real and lasting conservation (see Figure 1 below) (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005 Wunder, , 2015 . According to an early but still widely cited mainstream definition that set the foundation of the Mexican and other initiatives, PES is: '1. a voluntary transaction where; 2. a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service); 3. is being "bought" by a (minimum one) ES buyer; 4. from a (minimum one) ES provider; 5. if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)' (Wunder, 2005: 3) .
However, as is discussed in the introductory article to this special issue, the particular formations and forms of PES can vary significantly from this idealized model, being hybridized or altered, sometimes beyond recognition, by dynamic interactions with the development pathways of the sites of implementation and the situated agency of the actors involved (Shapiro-Garza et al., this issue) . Those advocating for the continued economistic logic of PES often dismiss variances from the ideal as rooted in an inability or unwillingness on the part of implementers to properly interpret or realize the model. As one recent article describes: 'Administrative ease, multiple non-environmental side objectives and social equity concerns may jointly help explain the reluctance to adopt more sophisticated, theoretically informed practices. However, by taking simplifying shortcuts in design and implementation, PES programmes may become less environmentally effective and efficient as economic incentives, thus underperforming their conservation potential' (Wunder et al., 2018: 145) .
This article examines the ways in which, and the reasons why, the theoretical foundations of PES have been contested, altered and adapted in the now 15-year history of national-scale PES programmes in Mexico. Contrary to the narrative of short-cutting practitioners and political shenanigans as the primary drivers of deviation (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2015) , the evolution of PES policy in Mexico has been strongly influenced by the situated agency of an epistemic community of public intellectuals who developed and promoted an alternative model. Their theorization of PES, termed 'Compensation for Ecosystem Services' (CES), is based on distinct understandings of the underlying drivers of environmental degradation and conservation, the relationship of campesinos (peasant farmers) and indigenous communities to their rural environment, and the roles of markets and the state that are both 'sophisticated and theoretically informed' (Wunder et al., 2018: 145) . While this alternative model incorporates the basic premise of the economistic theory of PES -that ecosystem services have value and that the managers of the ecosystems that produce them should be provided financial or other compensation -it differs on many other points. The conceptual elements of this model, even in its early articulations (Merino Pérez et al., 2005) , mirror the focus of the now considerable critical global scholarship on PES: the contested roles of markets and of the state (Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian, 2015; Vatn, 2010) ; the importance of incorporating and accounting for other values and the complexity of socionatural relationships (McAfee, 2012 , Singh, 2015 ; and the need to consider issues of equity and social justice at multiple scales (Corbera et al., 2007; Muradian et al., 2010) .
Although the proponents of this alternative CES model certainly were aware of the economistic roots of PES and its promotion by neoliberal institutions, they chose to engage. As will be explored further below, these public intellectuals argued that, turned on its head, the CES approach could be used as a tool to 'revalue the rural', combatting even the structural roots of environmental degradation. At the same time, exploring the complexity of their engagement with PES policy making at the national level provides a road map for the many ways and degrees to which alternative models and practices, mediated by existing institutions, political dynamics and relations of power, can challenge and adapt neoliberal models in practice, as well as the limitations of this approach.
This article applies the framework described in the Introduction to this special issue, taking a grounded, inductive approach to understanding how situated agency and development pathways articulated with or worked to alter the ideal-type, economistic model of PES (Shapiro-Garza et al., this issue) . The first two sections describe the history and political context in which the national PES programmes in Mexico were formed and the framing and methods applied in this research. The subsequent sections explore the genealogy of the alternative theorization of PES in Mexico, and dissect the various conceptual elements of this model and the ways in which they overlap with or differ from the original, economistic theory. The final substantive section provides a chronological account of how and in what ways this alternative theorization has, mediated by shifting political and other trends, influenced the design of the national PES programmes in Mexico.
THE POLITICS OF PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN MEXICO
The political context of Mexico, particularly the state's strong adoption of neoliberal principles and policies, helps explain the broad-scale uptake of the PES approach. It also provides an important lens for understanding why the actors who generated the alternative model of CES felt it necessary to do so and, ultimately, why and the extent to which the discourse they generated has been able to influence the processes and particularities of the policy design of the national PES programmes.
The concurrent rise of neoliberalism as a global political project and the dominance of the logic and discourse of neoclassical economics have been well documented and theorized (Barnett, 2005; Escobar, 1995) . A number of scholars have also explored the ways in which the concept of 'ecosystem services' -imagining nature as discrete, fungible bits of benefits that can be measured, assigned a monetary value and made available to be tradedhas intersected with the neoliberal ethos that holds that all things can and should be marketized (Dempsey and Robertson, 2012; Norgaard, 2010; Sullivan, 2009 ; also Shapiro-Garza et al., this issue) . Building on the theories of Coase and Pigou, environmental economists originally conceptualized PES as mechanisms through which the value of ecosystem services could be internalized in the economy through markets, or at least market-like approaches, as a more efficient and effective alternative to government regulations (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010) .
The political context in Mexico facilitated an early and enthusiastic adoption of PES. Mexico is considered one of the most highly 'neoliberalized' countries in Latin America. Starting in the 1980s, an elite cadre of economists led successive waves of neoliberal 'policy reforms' of the Mexican federal state and economy (Babb, 2004; Otero, 2013) . These included 13 structural adjustment loans (more than any other country in the region), a constitutional amendment that allowed for the privatization of communal lands, the cutting of price supports and technical assistance for crops vital to small producers, and the opening of markets for agricultural products through NAFTA and other trade agreements (Otero, 2013; Weaver et al., 2012) . As will be explored further below, PES, based on a logic of addressing environmental issues through the free market, meshed seamlessly with the neoliberal ethos in Mexico.
The campesinos and indigenous people in the 60 per cent of the forested lands in Mexico held as nucleos agrarios (federally recognized communal properties) (Madrid et al., 2009) were hard hit by the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s (Otero, 2013; Weaver et al., 2012) . The federal state in turn employed rural subsidy programmes as a means to temper the blows of economic restructuring, but also to gain political favour in rural areas and/or weaken the influence of growing peasant resistance movements (Otero, 2013) . The direct payments provided by PES therefore easily intersected with this established system of subsidies and served as an additional means to secure political capital with rural populations (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Shapiro-Garza, 2013a) .
While there have been a wide range of local and regional initiatives, the conceptualization, practice and ultimately the discourse of PES in Mexico have been most influenced by a series of national programmes run by the federal state. First implemented in 2003, these programmes represent one of the earliest and largest state-led PES initiatives in the world: as of 2016 they had enrolled 6,510,428 ha, which represents approximately 9.5 per cent of forested lands in Mexico (Zamora Martínez, 2016), belonging to 11,114 rural communities and small landholders (see Table 1 ). Since the programmes' implementation, they have been variously focused on hydrological services (the largest and longest-standing programme), biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, and the establishment of new or renovation of existing agroforestry systems. The general structure of these programmes has been to enrol smallholder private property owners and nucleos agrarios who voluntarily apply to enter the programme, and to then pay them set amounts per hectare annually for the life of the contract to maintain forest cover in areas of the landowners' choosing. For more specific information on payment rates, how the programmes have been targeted and the selection criteria used, see McAfee and Shapiro (2010) , Popovici (2017) , Shapiro-Garza (2013a) and Sims et al. (2014) . While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss how, by and for whom the national PES programme policies are 'translated' to grounded practice, and their eventual impacts, the research on these topics has demonstrated successful targeting of the programme to marginalized populations (Sims et al., 2014) , but considerable variation in both social and environmental outcomes based on geographic characteristics, politics and power relations in the sites of implementation (Ezzine de Blas et al., 2016b; Kosoy et al., 2008; Osborne and Shapiro-Garza, 2018; Popovici, 2017) .
The national PES programmes are overseen and implemented by a federal agency, the National Forestry Commission of Mexico (CONAFOR). Political control and resources are highly centralized in Mexico, and although there has been considerable state-and local-level variation in the grounded implementation and outcomes of the programmes (Ezzine de Blas et al., 2016b), policy decisions and oversight are firmly controlled by CONAFOR's central office in Guadalajara. Although these programmes have received some limited financial support from the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility, the great majority of funding has been allocated through the Mexican federal state. This means that the programmes, from the working minutiae of their design to their overall vision, have been subject to nationallevel political shifts and direction, which have, as discussed in more detail in the last substantive section of this article, provided openings at various times for the home-grown CES discourse to influence their ultimate design. That the PES programmes have represented one of the largest line items of CONAFOR's budget since their inception has also meant that they have been the focus of much interest, and critique, from those in the forestry sector in Mexico (Merino Pérez et al., 2008) .
FRAMING AND METHODS
There is now a significant literature exploring the processes through which the economistic model of PES is enacted and 'performed', characterizing the epistemic communities that promote this model and approach, their construction of discourses of value created and ecosystems conserved, and the influence they have had, or not, on grounded policy and practice (Büscher, 2014; Kolinjivadi et al., 2017; Rodriguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2015; Van Hecken et al., 2015) . Building upon these studies, this article analyses the discursive construction and influence of an alternative model of PES in Mexico. Discourse analysis is a useful frame not only for making explicit the ways and means through which global environmental governmentalities and rationalities are produced and continually reproduced (Adger et al., 2001; Hajer, 1995) , but also as a means for understanding and analysing grounded socio-environmental conflict as involving both the meaning and the material (Agrawal, 2005; Bryant, 1998) . A focus on discourse also helps elucidate the role of power in mediating '[t]he multi-level connections between global and local phenomena, not only in environmental functions but also in decisionmaking and hierarchies of power' (Adger et al., 2001: 682) . However, in any attempt to disentangle and clearly articulate distinct discourses or theorizations in the messy world of environmental policy making, it is difficult to avoid over-simplification or the unintended homogenization of the always ideologically heterogeneous individuals and groups who have developed and promoted them (Fairclough, 2013; Hajer, 1995) . While I have attempted to represent this complexity here, I am sure that there are those who will find fault. I welcome their critique.
This article builds upon multiple projects and long-term engagement, from 2005 to the present, with the Mexican National PES programmes and those involved in their design, administration and grounded implementation. 1 In McAfee and Shapiro (2010: 582-84) , we characterized four discursive assemblages of PES in Mexico: 1) conservation efficiency PES (characterized in this article as economistic PES); 2) pro-market, pro-poor PES; 3) compensation for ecosystem services (CES, also defined in this article); and 4) anti-PES. In Shapiro-Garza (2013b) , I explored the ways in which both the anti-PES and the CES discourses were articulated by actor groups involved in a massive rural social movement in Mexico, the tensions between the two, and the specific influence that particularly the latter had on the design of the then nascent national PES programmes. Based on the longitudinal and multi-scalar observations this engagement has provided, I identified the actors and organizations that have had the greatest influence on the development, promotion and enactment of CES theory and discourse in Mexico, particularly in the context of the national PES programmes (see next section for description). Between 2013 and 2018, I conducted a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 15 of the most influential 'key' actors who have theorized and promoted the CES model. I coded interview transcripts, along with relevant articles and policy documents, using the qualitative software NVivo 11. Coding was developed, iteratively, for themes related to the most prominent conceptual elements of the theorization of the CES discourse and for discussion of the role of power or existing institutions in shaping the evolution of the design of the national PES programmes.
My motivation for developing this characterization of the theoretical underpinnings and applications of the CES model in Mexico is twofold. First, I believe that it is both relevant and vital to clearly articulate this alternative theorization of PES as a signpost for other scholars and practitioners hoping to encounter, or create, similar alternatives. Second, I hope to demonstrate that many of the deviances in Mexico from the economistic model of PES are based not on laziness or an inability to interpret, but on sound, well-considered and developed alternative theorizations of humans, nature and the economy. This approach builds on the tradition in indigenous and feminist scholarship to 'decolonize' research and knowledge production more broadly (Mignolo, 2009; Sandoval, 2000) in that it attempts to make explicit and value an alternative way of knowing, and to do so with the particular intent of challenging the dominant -though as this and other articles in this special issue demonstrate, not always hegemonic -neoliberal political project (Van Hecken et al., 2018 ; also Shapiro-Garza et al., this issue).
GENEALOGY OF AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF PES
The actors in Mexico who developed, articulated and promoted the alternative, CES model are public or 'popular' intellectuals (Baud and Rutten, 2004) working with and for rural communities and movements around issues of sovereignty and securing the rights to cultural reproduction and the conditions for sustainable land management and livelihoods. As will be discussed in more detail below, these few public intellectuals formed an 'epistemic community' (Davis Cross, 2013) that had an outsized influence on the conceptualization and design of the national PES programmes in Mexico.
As is common in Latin America, these public intellectuals move between, or simultaneously hold, multiple positions as university professors, directors of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government administrators, or rural social movement leaders. Because of this positional fluidity, the development of the CES theory and discourse was influenced not only by these actors' experiences in the rarefied worlds of policy making and academia, but also from long-term, intensive engagement and dialogue with peasant and indigenous communities in Mexico. However, their ever-shifting institutional affiliations, often occasioned by shifts in national politics, meant that the channels and means through which they were able to influence the Mexican national PES programmes varied considerably over time; from street protests, to critical policy publications, to heading the government agencies responsible for the programmes' design and implementation.
While deeply embedded in the intellectual ethos and political experience of Mexico, the alternative model of PES described here was also influenced by other actors and movements in the region. Compensation for Ecosystem Services (CES) as a distinct theorization was first described in a report on nascent PES initiatives in Latin America developed by the El Salvadoran environmental think tank, PRISMA (Rosa et al., 2003) . The PRISMA report identified a number of potential hazards for rural communities posed by the original, economistic model of PES and proposed the CES framework as a means of ensuring that rural communities are included in the benefits and protected from the potential negative impacts of these initiatives (ibid.).
Mexico has a long and strong history of intellectual engagement with neo-Marxist and broader critical theory (Bartra, 2006; Otero, 2013) . Steeped in that tradition, these public intellectuals clearly identified the neoclassical economic roots of PES, as well as the neoliberal political project working to promote it. However, they also recognized the potential of these new policy mechanisms to provide significant financial support to counter the barrage of neoliberal 'reforms' in the 1980s and 1990s that had so impacted the lives of the rural communities with which they worked (Otero, 2013) . As the director of an NGO in the state of Oaxaca and a rural social movement leader explained: 'There are huge contradictions between the perspective of the neoliberals who promote [PES] programmes from the World Bank, etc., and those of us from the Mexican countryside. The fact that we were both interested in developing payments for environmental service programmes was just a lucky convergence of interests' (interview, Oaxaca de Júarez, Oaxaca, 30 November 2005). There were and are a number of social movement actors, NGOs and rural communities in Mexico who reject the concept of PES and the national programmes out of hand as yet another manifestation of neoliberal governance designed to divest rural people of their lands and livelihoods (Kosoy et al., 2008; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Shapiro-Garza, 2013b; UNORCA, 2002) . The actors and groups who are the focus of this article were certainly informed by, and most are sympathetic to, this position. They did, however, choose to engage.
While the actors that comprise this epistemic community in Mexico often use the terms 'payments' and 'compensation' interchangeably, for purposes of clarity, I refer here to this alternative theorization comprehensively as CES.
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: COMPENSATION FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
This section describes the various conceptual elements that are woven through and are at the foundation of the discourse of CES. The CES model incorporates the concept at the root of economistic theorization of PES: that ecosystem services have value and that the managers of the ecosystems that produce them should be compensated for doing so. However, it differs in many other, fundamental ways.
There is a difference in Spanish between pago (payment) and compensación (compensation), the first being a simple financial transaction, while the latter is relational, a recognition and honouring of valuable services rendered. While a 'compensation' exchange might involve money, it can also include labour, goods or even the generation of goodwill and a strengthening of social relations. The concept has its roots firmly planted in Mexican and Mexican indigenous culture. As a leader of an indigenous community in the state of Chiapas participating in an early workshop on the possibility of introducing PES schemes stated:
When you speak of 'payments' it leads us to associate it with money and to think that we are 'selling' that which nature produces. We cannot take ownership of the work of nature, but we can demand recognition for the work that we do that helps nature and that benefits other people. That way it is not just a payment, but a remuneration, a recognition and a rescuing of the indigenous practice of reciprocity. (Burstein, 2003: 5) A proponent of the CES model, and one-time head of the national programmes in Mexico, explained the differences in meaning between the two terms as they relate to the broader conceptualization and application of this approach:
I prefer the concept of compensation more because the interaction between the user and provider is based on trust. It is not that 'I pay you, now you have to fulfil your obligation', but that 'We need to build something together'. It is that we both have a problem, but I have to help you so that I don't have a problem as well. The recognition of this interdependence leads to compensation mechanisms developed through respectful, interactive dialogue, one to another. (Interview, Guadalajara, Jalisco, 31 August 2017) Linking conceptually to a discourse of 'revaluing the rural' which has been employed by social movements in Mexico, and throughout Latin America, to counter neoliberal policies and policy makers, the promoters of the CES model in Mexico situate campesinos and indigenous peoples as 'traditional stewards' of ecosystem health and well-being, with strong, interlinking motives and existing knowledge to manage them sustainably (Shapiro-Garza, 2013b) . Utilizing the greater complexity that the CES model allows, they position 'compensation' for the provision of ecosystem services as a reconocimiento (recognition) by urban dwellers and industrialized countries of the value of the labour, cultural knowledge and practices of these traditional stewards (Shapiro-Garza, 2013b; Van Hecken et al., 2018) . As a rural social movement leader and NGO director framed it, CES is, 'A new type of relation within a country and between countries. It is not just about sales and monetary gains; it is a new form of relationship: between the city and the countryside; industries and campesinos; developed countries and undeveloped countries; regions that are producers of waste and those that are producers of oxygen' (interview, Oaxaca de Juárez, Oaxaca, 22 November 2005) . Or as another CES-aligned NGO leader explained, the intention of the CES approach is to create a 'virtuous cycle' between rural and urban dwellers that can be a driving force, and even the ultimate goal, of these initiatives (interview, Xalapa, Vercruz, 10 May 2013).
This framing of 'compensation' as a recognition of valuable stewardship shifts, at a fundamental level, the rationale for providing financial or other 'incentives' to the 'producers' of ecosystem services, one of the core components of what distinguishes PES from other approaches. According to the economistic model of PES, the purpose of payments is to convince rational, selfish actors who would otherwise change their land use to more profitable, but degrading activities to instead choose ecosystem servicegenerating management options (see Figure 1 below). As Wunder (2007: 53) states, It seems certain that neither the community that fully safeguards its environment nor the impoverished farmer . . . will emerge on the scene as major sellers of [ES] . These groups do not constitute a credible threat, so paying them creates zero additionality. . . . The ideal seller of [ES] is, if not outright environmentally nasty, then at least on the edge of becoming so.
In the CES model, the financial component of 'compensation' is instead conceptualized as both a reward for and recognition of existing good stewardship and as covering the incremental transaction costs of labour, equipment and capacity building to allow these stewards to enhance their sustainable management practices in ways that they would have done if not financially or otherwise constrained.
Positioning campesino and indigenous land owners as stewards as opposed to degraders also, as a CONAFOR administrator of the national PES programmes and a proponent of the CES model explained, provides a strong argument for the value and necessity of using these initiatives to help keep them on the land: Because forested areas in Mexico are the sites of all sorts of issues -fires, drugs, illegal logging and all of that -what you want to do is keep people in the forest so they can work and secure their livelihoods from the forest and be its guards. Because Mexico does not have the capacity like the United States to have rangers all over the country looking out for the forest, you need to keep people there. (Interview, Guadalajara, Jalisco, 15 February 2018) This reframing of the basic rationale underlying the 'compensation' involved in these schemes, while working to 'revalue' indigenous and campesino lives and livelihoods, also, as will be discussed further below, has pragmatic implications for policy design, from the degree to which the state versus markets should be involved, to the criteria used for targeting, to the setting of payment rates and structure.
Addressing the Structural Roots of Environmental Degradation
The economistic model of PES envisions a fairly simplistic set of ideal outcomes (i.e. measurable increase in the production of the targeted ecosystem service) and the mechanisms through which they would be incentivized and achieved (i.e. direct, conditional financial transactions between service users and providers) (Wunder, 2005) . According to the logic of this model, as long as one sets payment rates just a bit higher than the opportunity costs of conversion to other uses, provides minimal facilitation of the transfer of financial incentives from users to providers, monitors the production of ecosystem services and finds ways to make payments contingent on their production, PES should work as illustrated in Figure 1 
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Hydropower production Domestic water supply Payment Source: Pagiola (2006: 13) In contrast, the CES model recognizes the need to address the complex structural issues that underlie and drive both social injustice and environmental degradation. This basic premise translates into a number of specific policy design principles that, as will be discussed further below, CES advocates were able to introduce into the national PES programmes: that compensation levels should be set based on the holistic suite of 'values' held for the ES produced and the costs of implementation; that direct incentives need to be integrated within a suite of other approaches; that active, productive management of enrolled ecosystems must be allowed and even encouraged; and that the programme should be targeted to populations marginalized by structural inequities and injustices.
Integration with a Holistic Suite of Approaches
Promotors of the CES model claim that providing payments alone will not be enough to bring about substantive or lasting change, advocating instead for diversified, holistic approaches. As the director of an influential NGO explained:
[PES] is like a violin without the symphony. That is not sustainability. . . . For me, PES is nothing more than a tool. A truly holistic approach encompasses all that we do. . . . If we have managed to control the agricultural frontier, it is because there are payments, because there are regulations, because there is awareness building, because there are other alternatives. . . . That is why I say that the pure payment itself is one instrument in a symphony, nothing more. (Interview, Jalpan de Serra, Queretaro, 9 June 2015) An interesting extension of this argument is that holistic, multifaceted support to participants can 'add value' to these initiatives in ways that can overcome purely economic barriers. In one example, the director of an influential NGO with long-term engagement with the national programmes stated that CONAFOR officials initially told them that PES would not be viable in much of their target watershed, particularly, in areas where opportunity cost was very high . . . because you cannot compete, which is absolutely true. It is impossible to compete, for example, with a potato crop that in a year will produce MX$ 60,000 per hectare. . . . That's why we do not want to compete in the economic arena because we cannot compete at all. For this reason we take a 'compensation' approach, offering a small subsidy for forest [conservation] , but also a strong relationship and a lot of support to develop alternative activities, such as flowers, ecotourism, whatever. (Interview, Xalapa, Veracruz, 10 May 2013) This was a common theme amongst the CES actors interviewed: examples in which the opportunity cost of conversion to other uses was higher than the programme payments, but where owners chose to participate and conserve because of the additional, less direct benefits offered.
Active and Productive Management and Use of Enrolled Ecosystems
Another strong and constant thread in the CES discourse is that these initiatives should allow and support productive, sustainable management and use of the enrolled ecosystems. An early policy brief authored by some of the primary developers and proponents of the CES model focused on the newly formed national payments for hydrological services programme (see Table 1 above). Published by the sustainable forestry think tank, the Mexican Civic Council for Sustainable Forestry (CCMSS), the brief advocated for allowing lands under productive management, including sustainably managed timber lands and agroforestry systems, to be enrolled in the programme (Merino Pérez et al., 2005) . These CES proponents argued that active engagement in managing productive ecosystems is necessary both for the cultural reproduction of rural communities and to ensure that the national and other PES programmes serve as 'a complement to initiatives for sustainable forest use, valuing and financing rural conservation efforts' (Merino Pérez et al., 2008: 164) . Along these same lines, the CES model also insists that these initiatives should produce ecosystem services of local importance to ensure that participants benefit and to keep them engaged. As a publication from a CES-aligned NGO stated:
The economic revaluation of ecosystems is an indispensable condition to achieve conservation, since this is equivalent to the interest of local communities to conserve their land. Thus, watershed restoration and sanitation are promoted to increase water production and availability and agricultural productivity; reforestation and management of natural regeneration for wood production; the compensations to owners who have conserved their forests, as the best way to ensure the continuity of the environmental services they generate. (Ruiz Corzo and Pedrazo Ruiz, 2007: 109) Mirroring the simplicity of the economistic model of PES, the earliest iterations of the national PES programmes specified that no use or management was allowed in enrolled forest lands. The CCMSS policy brief provided a clearly articulated counter to this approach (Merino Pérez et al., 2005) . It purported that the 'no-touch' policy of the PES programmes represented a continuation of the paternalistic approach of the federal government towards rural communities embedded in innumerable subsidy programmes, which 'promote a passive and "rent-seeking" attitude among the beneficiaries, by subsidizing "no action". Applied over prolonged periods, this programme can contribute to deepening the processes of abandonment of forests and villages in forested areas' (ibid.: 12). The authors instead called for the programme contracts to 'contain a series of commitments and obligations based on the particular conditions of each case' (ibid.: 14).
The argument for requiring active management of enrolled ecosystems leads to a point of agreement between the economistic model of PES and CES: the need for conditionality. The economistic model argues that payments be conditional on the measured production of the targeted ecosystem service (Wunder, 2007) . The promoters of the CES model also advocate for conditionality, with the alternative rationale of avoiding the dependencycreating paternalism described above, but also because they too hope for positive environmental, as well as social, outcomes. However, CES proponents also recognize that structural inequities meant that marginalized rural communities may face barriers in being able to plan for and complete required management activities. As will be discussed further below, they advocated for and ensured that the national PES programmes included an option to apply for an initial year of funding for project development and specific funding for technical support and capacity building. In order to ensure that the activities required by the programme were in line with participants' needs and capacities, and best adapted to the site, CES actors also promoted active involvement in developing management plans.
Distributional Equity and Social Justice
Another essential element of the CES model is that these initiatives can and should be used to rectify issues of distributional equity and social justice. According to the economistic PES model, in order to optimize the efficiency of production of ecosystem services, targeting criteria should only be based on assessments of where payments will produce the biggest environmental bang for the buck, are most likely to form markets, and where land owners would be willing to accept a reasonable rate (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Wunder, 2007) . While the CES model certainly supports the use of environmental selection criteria, it also advocates for targeting rules favouring marginalized populations. In the case of the Mexican national programmes, CES proponents advocated for, and won, a cap on the land area private property owners could enrol; eligibility and selection criteria that favoured female applicants; communal properties and properties located in municipalities with high rates of poverty and indigenous populations as well as those inside protected areas (Sims et al., 2014) .
Of these CES-aligned policy elements, preferential targeting to property owners within protected areas has been most contested by those wishing to re-impose the purity of the economistic PES model on the national programmes. As an author of the 2005 CCMSS policy brief, who later served as director of the national PES and other programmes at CONAFOR, described: 'The economists say, "you should not include these properties because the opportunity cost is nothing since they are in a protected area"' (interview, Guadalajara, Jalisco, 21 August 2017). However, this same CONAFOR administrator argued, 'Protected areas in Mexico are not like those in other countries where they are the property of the state. Here they are [simply situated on top of] private or communal properties and then restrictions are imposed on how it can be used. These owners should be compensated, but they are not' (ibid.).
According to the CES model, targeting properties inside protected areas -similar to the broader rationale for targeting other communities beset and impacted by structural inequities -is based on both a moral rationale (providing 'compensation' for the injustice of loss of access to natural resources that occurs when a protected area is created) and pragmatic reasoning (payments keep people from exploiting resources within the protected areas by calming resentments over imposed lack of access and providing an alternative source of income).
The Role of Markets and of the State
The economistic model envisioned PES as a means to counteract what the original PES theorists portrayed as the inherent inefficiencies of government regulations and their lack of sustainability due to inevitable changes in political will (Engel et al., 2008; World Bank, 2006) . While proponents of this model acknowledge that forming true markets for ecosystem services is not always possible, markets or market-like arrangements are still promoted as the gold standard (Wunder et al., 2018) . A number of rural organizations and social movements in Mexico rejected the promotion of the formation of markets for ecosystem services as another of many neoliberal Trojan horses (Kosoy et al., 2008; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010) . Those who theorized and advocated for the CES model were initially more agnostic about the potential sources of funding for their work and for the rural communities they serve: markets, market-like mechanisms, government subsidies or other supports. Most accepted the possibility that, similar to the antecedent market-based approaches of ecotourism or certifications for sustainably managed timber or coffee, creation of markets for ecosystem services, if integrated as just one component of a more holistic suite of approaches, held some promise. However, they also always envisioned a strong, continued role for the state and, as markets for ES have largely failed to materialize, have moved away from this conceptualization of how these initiatives can and should be structured and funded.
After 20 years and innumerable and varied attempts, there are very few examples of direct market transactions of ES in Mexico, and even the widely touted 'successful' cases have been highly volatile (Osborne and Shapiro-Garza, 2018; Shapiro-Garza, 2013a) . As an NGO leader who made concerted but unsuccessful attempts to create a payments for a hydrological services arrangement between the rural communities with whom they work and the thriving tourism industry downstream described it:
I believe that the model [of PES] that emerged from the economistic vision . . . where suddenly you were told, 'you need to internalize the costs, etc.', is not real, that there is not a market as such. The market for ecosystem services does not exist, to the point where there are very few cases in which you can say that there even exists a system of payments and it is clear who is paying, why they are paying, etc. (Interview, Oaxaca de Juárez, Oaxaca, 16 June 2015) As the head of the civilian oversight committee of the national PES programme said, reflecting on the clear lack of ES market formation, 'The term [PES] "mechanism" seems right to me because it presupposes that it might be a market or some other type of arrangement, which seems very reasonable since this matches with what has actually happened' (interview, Mexico City, Distrito Federal, 20 September 2013) .
The CES model also includes a strong, necessary and continued role for the state. For one, CES advocates point to the need for the state to be involved in promoting the formation of markets and in their subsequent regulation. As the CCMSS report emphasized, 'The creation of markets that do not yet exist is constituted through a political process, which requires the intervention of the state at some scale (federal/state/local)' (Merino Pérez et al., 2005: 10) . While involvement of the state in market formation and promotion, or the establishment of market-like approaches, is certainly not antithetical to either neoliberalism (Bakker, 2010) or the economistic model of PES (Engel et al., 2008) , the CES model adds further layers to the argument for continued state involvement. CES proponents emphasize that the role of the state is complicated by the fact that ecosystem services are public goods, and in the case of access to water, a human right guaranteed by the federal government of Mexico, confounding their commodification. As the CCMSS report cautioned: 'Ecosystem services represent matters of public interest, so access to them must be guaranteed for the entire population. Their access cannot be restricted only to those who have the ability to pay. In this sense, although the presence of markets is important and necessary, the state has the responsibility to ensure access to ecosystem services' (Merino Pérez et al., 2005: 10) . An NGO leader put it a bit more directly, saying, 'I do not know to what extent [the national PES programmes] will become other than a subsidy scheme when the water law dictates that a healthy environment is part of the public services that the government is obligated to provide' (interview, Oaxaca de Juárez, Oaxaca, 16 June 2015).
The tension highlighted by CES proponents, between ecosystem services as a commodity to be bought and sold through markets versus a public good and human right, complicates the role of the state in PES, pitting its potential as a facilitator of market formation for ecosystem services against its much more established role as the provider and protector of access. In Mexico, with a history and continued dominance of a highly centralized and powerful state, the policy choices thus far have largely favoured the latter (Shapiro-Garza, 2013a) .
POWER, POLITICS AND ARTICULATION OF COMPENSATION FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
As described above, the Mexican federal state has, since 2003, created a constellation of national-scale PES programmes (see Table 1 ). This section describes the specific influence of the CES model on the conceptualization and design of these programmes, and the ways in which the articulation of this discourse was mediated by the ever-shifting federal politics of Mexico, which, in turn, has affected the power of its proponents to influence the design of the national programmes.
Formation (2001-2003)
After a pilot in 2001-02 funded through the World Bank, the national Payments for Hydrological Services programme was launched in 2003 (see Table 1 ). The individuals who originally promoted PES in Mexico and designed the pilot programme were economists by training and persuasion, based at national and US universities, in Mexico's federal environmental policy think tank and at the World Bank (Alix-Garcia et al., 2008; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008) . Although the programmes were administered by CONAFOR, these economists continued to exert a strong and ongoing influence over their conceptualization and design, as formal and informal advisors, through the contingencies imposed by World Bank loans or, in one case, being appointed as Director General of CONAFOR.
During this early phase of the national PES programmes, the primary conceptual clashes were between these environmental economists and the newly appointed programme administrators at CONAFOR. In describing the dynamics with this group of economists, one of the CONAFOR administrators at the time said, 'they were always pushing so that they could test their model' (interview, Guadalajara, Jalisco, 15 February 2018) . A number of the early design features that CONAFOR officials instituted, while motivated by legal and institutional restrictions, not to mention the politics of rural poverty alleviation in Mexico (Shapiro-Garza, 2013a) , also overlapped with CES goals: targeting of the rural poor and indigenous communities and placing upper limits on total land area enrolled; reinforcing the traditional governance structures of nucleos agrarios instead of making payments directly to individual households within communities; and firmly maintaining centralized state control of the programme's funding, design and administration (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Shapiro-Garza, 2013a) . The economists continued to push back against these and other design elements they felt made the programme less 'market-like', focusing particularly on the targeting of the programme based on any but environmental criteria (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008) . A Project Information Document for a World Bank loan in the third year of implementation that was intended to strengthen the programmes' ability to create markets for ecosystem services, critiqued the continued control by the state which it claimed made the PES programmes 'subject to political decision making' and to targeting payments to the poor, which 'risks undermining their primary objective of generating valuable ecosystem services' (World Bank, 2006: 13) .
Contestation (2003-2005)
The first year of the federal PES programme, 2003, coincided with the rise of a national-scale rural social movement, the Countryside Can't Stand Anymore Movement! (Movimiento el Campo no Aguanta Más -MECNAM!) (Shapiro-Garza, 2013b) . MECNAM!, to which the majority of the CES-advocating public intellectuals were aligned, mobilized campesinos and indigenous communities against the 'opening and modernization' of the agricultural sector through neoliberal policies, and in support of the democratization of what had previously been a one-party state (ibid.). After months of large-scale protests and marches, then president Vincente Fox conceded to a review of all federal policies and programmes involving rural areas and agriculture, and to allowing MECNAM! representatives to participate (Marielle and Aguilar, 2003) . The MECNAM! representatives demanded and won, among other concessions, the formation of a second branch of the national PES programme, PSA-CABSA (see Table 1 ), focused on payments for carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and agroforestry systems, and placement of their representatives on the design committee (Shapiro-Garza, 2013b) .
Shortly after the formation of the PSA-CABSA programme, the previously mentioned CCMSS policy brief was published, providing the first clear and cohesive articulation of the CES model (Merino Pérez et al., 2005) . This publication had a significant impact on the early design of the PES programmes, both indirectly by broadly influencing the conceptual underpinnings of national and other Mexican initiatives, and directly, as many of its authors served on the PSA-CABSA and later advisory committees. These CES advocates continued to produce critical research, reports and newspaper editorials on the programmes, and even, as discussed below, served as directors of the programmes for CONAFOR. The arguments made in the CCMSS publication still underlie the current discourse of CES in Mexico and foreshadow much of the global critical scholarship on PES produced since.
Despite being tempered by the presence on the PSA-CABSA design committee of some of the original proponents of the economistic model, MEC-NAM! representatives -in some cases finding allies among members from government agencies -were able to introduce a number of CES policy elements into the new programme. Based on the previously discussed discourse that 'traditional rural stewards' should be allowed, and given support, to actively manage enrolled forests, they lobbied for and won an optional one-year of funding for project development and for external technical assistance and training of community forestry extension workers. The discursive argument for allowing and encouraging 'productive management' of enrolled lands resulted in the improvement of existing and introduction of new agroforestry systems being made eligible for inclusion in the programme. However, the CES advocates on the committee were subjected to considerable push back against their proposal to include lands under sustainable timber harvest and at that point it was not allowed, although it has since been introduced into a number of the programmes. In conjunction with representatives from the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP), they also advocated for and won the right for properties in protected areas to enrol, which, as mentioned previously, was and continues to be highly contested by proponents of the economistic model of PES.
Although the PSA-CABSA design committee was disbanded in 2006, many of the policy and discursive changes introduced have since been expanded to the other national PES programmes. As one MECNAM! leader on the design committee described the influence of their participation: 'That it was accepted that active management is not antithetical to conservation; that the multifunctionality of ecosystems was recognized; and, ultimately, that it is not just a payment but a true contract' (interview, Mexico City, Distrito Federal, 29 June 2006) .
Working from Within (2006-2012)
A new president of Mexico, Felipe Calderón, was elected in 2006. An economist himself, Calderón appointed one of the economists who had been involved in designing the pilot for the national PES programme as Director General of CONAFOR. In a somewhat surprising move, the new Director appointed a number of the most outspoken CES advocates to run the national programmes. As a result, this era of the national PES programme was characterized by the predominance of the CES model in its design.
One early and persistent change during this period was the opening of various channels through which programme participants and their CESaligned representatives could provide direct feedback on the programmes' design and operations. In 2006, the Technical Advisory Committee (CTC) replaced the PSA-CABSA design committee and, although the CTC had no direct decision-making power, it still proved to be a strong channel for external feedback. As one administrator of the national PES programmes described it, 'In my opinion, that platform was the one responsible for so many of the changes [to the national PES programmes]. It was this very participatory platform where you had all the government agencies represented . . . and the environmental sector and the NGOs and academia' (interview, Guadalajara, Jalisco, 15 February 2018) . Among other CESaligned outcomes of the CTC were the inclusion of further social criteria in the targeting of the programme, moves away from using estimates of opportunity cost of conversion to set payment rates, and many more subtle, CES-aligned changes to the rules of operation.
During this period, CONAFOR also created the Local PES Mechanisms through Matching Funds (ML-PSA) programme, first implemented in 2008 (see Table 1 ). The programme is structured to support the development of institutional infrastructure for PES. CONAFOR partners with a local, intermediary organization and provides half of the funding for payments as well as technical and other support. The initial motive for forming the ML-PSA programme was at least partially to target areas with apparent demand for ecosystem services in the hope that markets or market-like exchanges would form. However, it was also built on the recognition that the state, at multiple scales, can and should play important, sustained roles and that financial incentives should be accompanied by a holistic suite of other approaches. Not only has CONAFOR taken on new roles through this programme, from the formation and regulation of the institutions necessary for the financial management of the payments, to the sustained monitoring of outcomes, they have also largely partnered with other state and civil society actors: municipalities, state governments, public water utilities and rural community NGOs. There was also a clearly articulated motive in the formation of the ML-PSA programme of attempting to tropicalizar, or adapt, PES to meet local contexts and conditions, with CONAFOR allowing partner organizations to use their own portion of the funding to support other, more holistic suites of approaches beyond those prescribed by the national PES programme. Contrary to the original intent of this programme, markets or even market-like relationships between users and providers have in almost all cases failed to form, with CONAFOR and other state actors continuing to play the major roles in both funding and running these initiatives (Popovici, 2017) .
On the Outside Again (2013-2018)
In 2012, the PRI -the authoritarian party who had previously governed Mexico for 71 years -won the presidential election and came to power at the federal level once again. The impacts at CONAFOR were felt almost immediately, with those who promoted the CES model replaced by those with greater allegiance to the PRI and, in line with their ethos, to the economistic model of PES. The new leadership of the national PES programmes, in direct consultation with World Bank advisors again, reversed a number of the design elements that the CES proponents had implemented. They removed many of the 'social' criteria intended to target the programme to marginalized populations, instead applying criteria thought to increase environmental impacts (e.g. risk of deforestation, value of habitat for biodiversity conservation, etc.) and the likelihood of market formation (e.g. high degree of water scarcity, populations downstream, etc.). In the ML-PSA programme, CONAFOR began to move away from partnering with community-focused NGOs in favour of private companies, including extractive industries, and state governments in a move back to the PRI's pre-existing modus operandi of political clientelism. At the same time, the new administration shut or reduced the channels which had allowed external actors to have a voice in programme design and operation. Although the CTC advisory committee continues to exist, its role has become much more limited. As an NGO leader and CES proponent observed of the current state of the PES programme, 'Currently, the CONAFOR relationship with participants [in the PES programmes] is very vertical, "I pay you because you are going to do it"' (interview, Oaxaca de Juárez, Oaxaca, 16 June 2015).
Still the proponents of the CES model continued the fight to influence the national discourse. As one of the authors of the original CCMSS report proclaimed in an editorial in the national press: 'Many ejidos and indigenous communities . . . are committed to maintaining and conserving their forests and require support in planning how to do so. . . . The Program of Payments for Environmental Services should focus on this type of forest ecosystem and communities interested in conserving their natural heritage' (Anta Fonseca, 2018) .
DISCUSSION
This article has explored the roots and the various conceptual elements of a clearly articulated, alternative theorization of PES that has been influential in shaping both the rationale and the particular design of the national programmes in Mexico. The public intellectuals, leaders of social movements and NGOs, academics and government administrators, who developed and promoted the CES model were deeply committed to the idea that rural development and keeping 'traditional stewards' on the land is intertwined with and necessary for environmental protection. While recognizing the neoclassical roots of the PES model and its promotion as part of neoliberal practice, they believed that the attempt to recognize the societal worth of healthy ecosystems could be harnessed, hybridized and employed as a means to 'revalue the rural' after years of damaging neoliberal reforms. The primary elements of the CES model, summarized in Table 2 , were built upon their theoretical framing and lived experience of rural politics and practice in Mexico. What is clear is that the CES model represents a cohesive, 'sophisticated and theoretically informed' (Wunder et al., 2018: 145) alternative theorization of PES that, while incorporating some elements of the economistic definition, represents a distinct series of rationales for why, how and by whom compensation should be provided to the producers of ecosystem services.
It is also clear that the foundational assumptions and many specific policies now represented in the national PES programme design have been built upon the CES model, fought for and won by its promotors: earmarked funding for technical support and capacity building; the inclusion of actively managed, productive forests; greater participation by enrollees in deciding which management activities they will undertake; allowing local organizations to apply more holistic approaches adapted to local conditions; the preferential targeting of the programmes to marginalized populations or those (e.g. in protected areas) who have suffered an injustice at the hands of the state; and, overall, a turn away from the focus on the formation of markets for ES, to a recognition and codification of the strong, continued role of the state.
The dominance of economistic discourse and logic in policy making in the neoliberal age has been well noted and theorized, at both an international level (Barnett 2005; Escobar, 1995; Norgaard, 2010) and within Mexico (Babb, 2004) . Market-based environmental approaches such as PES, based as they are so directly on neoclassical economic theory, intersect smoothly with the assumptions that underlie neoliberal policy making (Norgaard, , 2015) . This was certainly the case in Mexico, where environmental economists, both within the federal government and from the World Bank, were integral in the design of the national PES programmes and in continuing to push for a re-imposition of their model of PES (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008) . While 'administrative ease' (Wunder et al., 2018: 145) , political priorities and conformity to preexisting legal and bureaucratic constraints obviously motivated some of the variance from the economistic model (Shapiro-Garza, 2013a) , much can also be ascribed to direct contestation by those who promulgated the CES discourse. While, as has been noted here and by other scholars (Büscher, 2014; Kolinjivadi et al., 2017; Van Hecken et al., 2015) , power and access to power absolutely mediated the ability of the epistemic community of CES-aligned actors to influence the national PES policy design, many of the alterations to both rationale and specific design can be traced to their efforts. This understanding of PES or other market-based environmental approaches as mutable, subject to active contestation, adaptation or hybridization even in sites of implementation as 'neoliberalized' as Mexico, also pushes against those who purport that these approaches are necessarily hegemonic tools of neoliberalism (Fletcher and Büscher, 2017) . Many of the tensions between the economistic model of PES and its grounded practice highlighted by the promotors of CES in Mexico foreshadowed those noted by both normative and critical theoreticians: the inevitable need for some degree of state involvement (Vatn, 2010) ; the difficulty of forming markets or market-like transactions for ecosystem services and their volatility once formed (Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian, 2015) ; the critique of the use of opportunity costs of conversion to other uses as a means to calculate payment rates (McAfee, 2012 ; also Greenleaf, this issue); the importance of accounting for other values that might motivate conservation (Singh, 2015) ; and the need to consider the equitable distribution of costs and benefits for ensuring both environmental and social outcomes (Corbera et al., 2007; Muradian et al., 2010) . Many of the elements of these alternative theorizations of PES were articulated early on by public intellectuals in Mexico (Merino Pérez et al., 2005) and, while aware of these external critiques, the CES model was and continues to be rooted in and informed by their very particular experience of the politics and practices of rural Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis clearly demonstrates the ways in which an alternative theorization of PES, articulated and applied through the vision, narratives and practice of an epistemic community of influential public intellectuals in Mexico, worked to alter both the underlying rationale and the ultimate conformation of the national PES programmes in Mexico. In unpacking the differences between the PES and CES models, some of the variance can be explained through the lens of development as bricolage, with every enacted initiative inevitably evolving as a mix of imposed and indigenous ontologies and institutions (Cleaver, 2012) . However, as this analysis demonstrates, in the case of PES in Mexico this evolution was also the result of active contestation by this epistemic community of actors, informed by a deep engagement with rural communities and their realities, who held and promoted distinct, theoretically informed and clearly articulated ideas about both the means and meaning of 'sustainable development' and the role that financial incentive programmes such as PES can and should play (Van Hecken et al., 2018) .
In line with the framing of the introductory article to this special issue (Shapiro-Garza et al., this issue) , the actors who advocated for the CES model, their agency and the ways and channels through which it was exercised, were obviously mediated by the historical pathways of development in Mexico. Yet those same historical trajectories -the grounded ontologies, power relations, and political and cultural trends -also clearly informed the conceptualization and articulation of the CES model and the ways in which its proponents were able to counter, articulate with and adapt the basic elements of the economistic model of PES. What becomes absolutely clear in exploring the CES discourse is that this alternative conceptualization and practice is nuanced, theoretically grounded and clearly conceptualized, and that it has had a substantive and lasting influence on the form and formation of the national PES programmes in Mexico.
